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INTRODUCTION
Most prominent models of visual object perception (e.g.
Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982) view the apprehension of a
particular object in an image as exclusively based on a
data-driven and pre-conceptual recovery of the object's
structural features (i.e. geons, contoursegments, etc.) from
the image. Research on object perception in full scene
context, however, has suggested that this view may need to
be modified if one wishes to model more than the perception
of unanticipated, isolated objects. The purpose of the
present thesis is to contribute to an evaluation of the
degree to which this challenge should be taken seriously.
The first chapter of this thesis will present and discuss
the two main lines of research developed in the study of
effects of scene context on object identification. An
initial section in this chapter will deal with research
concentrating on the question whether scene context has any
influence on the nature of the pattern recognition processes
involved in object identification. The central assumption
in this research is that prior to or during the first glance
at a real-world scene, a scene-specific schema or frame is
activated which provides an integrated representation of the
typical makeup and contents of the viewed scene. Based on
this assumption, several authors have advanced the hypo-
thesis that the identification of objects with a high
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probability of appearance in a given scene, is based on the
concept-driven and resource-inexpensive detection of global
object features specified in the frame representing that
scene. This in contrast, they propose, to either improbable
or isolated objects which are identified on the basis of a
data-driven and resource-demanding analysis of visual
detail. While the studies designed to test this hypothesis
have generally yielded results which have been taken to
corroborate its validity, a detailed examination of the evi-
dence will be presented in order to demonstrate that this
conclusion may be unwarranted.
A second section will review research which emphasizes
that scene context affects object identification by pro-
viding a frame of reference in which spatial object-context
relations define a set of relational object features which
are used as a basis for object recognition. Based on an
analysis of what distinguishes a well-formed, natural scene
from an unstructured array of isolated objects, it has been
argued that an object's appearance in such a scene can not
only be characterized as probable, but also conforms to a
limited set of fundamental spatial object-context relations.
The concrete realization of these relations in the appear-
ance of a particular object in a particular scene is con-
sidered to be quite stable across instances of that
object-scene combination. Consequently, an object's typical
spatial relations to a scene it is likely to appear in, are
taken to be an integral part of the global schema for that
scene. Under the assumption that such schemas are inevi-
tably activated in the earliest stages of scene exploration,
it has been hypothesized that relational object features are
an integral part of the image information used for object
identification in scenes, since a number of studies
examining this hypothesis appear to indicate that violations
of spatial object-context relations decrease the identi-
fiability of objects, its validity has generally been
accepted. Again however, a detailed discussion of this
research will be presented in order to demonstrate that this
conclusion may not be justified.
Based on the review presented in the first chapter, it
will be argued that only an object's probability of
appearing in a scene can safely be regarded as having a
genuine effect on the ease with which the object can be
identified. One can therefore pose the question of how
existing models of object perception should be modified in
order to account for this contextual effect. In order to
answer this question, it is necessary to decide between two
alternative views that have been proposed in order to
account for the object probability effect. On the first
view, the effect reflects a top-down influence of a global
scene-schema, resulting in the concept-driven identification
of individual objects. If correct, this would necessitate a
drastic revision of the presently accepted data-driven
accounts of object perception. On the second view, however,
such a revision would not be required since it attributes
the object probability effect to the operation of a passive
priming mechanism between the individual object represen-
tations that are used to categorize the object models
computed through data-driven feature analysis of an image.
The remainder of the thesis therefore will focus on
evaluating the validity of this simpler and more conser-
vative inter-object priming account.
Specifically, the second chapter will identify three
possible constraints on this priming mechanism, which, if
proven to be true limits, could serve as basis for an
empirical and unequivocal test of the mechanism's validity
as an explanation of context effects in full scenes.
Finally, in the third chapter two experiments are
reported which were designed to test the existence of these
three possible constraints. Based on the results obtained
in these experiments, some conclusions are offered with
regard to the nature of the inter-object priming mechanism
and a test of its role in an account of real-world scene
perception.
CHAPTER 1
EFFECTS OF SCENE CONTEXT ON OBJECT IDENTIFICATION:
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEORIES
Effects of Scene Context on Pattern T^Pnnr^ni i-
^
Processes i n Object Identification
As mentioned earlier, most research on scene context
effects has been inspired by the assumption that real-world
scene perception is mediated by scene-specific schemas,
activated prior to or during the first few glances at a
scene. The rationale behind this central assumption and the
predictions that have been derived from it with respect to
the context-sensitivity of object pattern recognition, have
been outlined most clearly by Friedman (1979).
In her frame theory of scene perception, Friedman sets
out from the position that apprehending natural scenes and
their components from arrays of optical information requires
an interaction between the output of low-level feature
analyzers and a priori knowledge about how those features go
together and what scene (component) these feature combina-
tions signify. This a priori knowledge, she assumes, takes
on the form of frames (or schemas) which each constitute a
representation of a particular reality at a specific level
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of abstraction or globality (e.g. shape-frames, volume-
frames, object-frames, place-frames, scene- frames, etc.).
At the basis of this assumption lies the view that frames
-as outlined in various theories of world knowledge
representation (e.g. Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Minsky, 1975;
Palmer, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977)- have certain
properties which allow them to function as powerful pattern
interpreters.
The first one is that they employ an abstract repre-
sentational format (i.e. propositions or procedures) which
allows for the integration into one frame of the viewer's
knowledge about both the semantic and physical characteris-
tics of its real-world referent. Consequently, as Palmer
(1975) points out, no resources need to be spent in trans-
lating visual information into a code allowing for its
meaningful interpretation.
A second property is that they represent a particular
reality in a prototypical fashion, i.e. in terms of both its
invariant characteristics and limited ranges or probabilis-
tic distributions of concrete values its variable charac-
teristics can take on. This implies that, given sufficient-
ly broad experience with exemplars of scenes and their
components, i) a limited number of these frames will provide
sufficient power and flexibility to interpret a wide variety
of feature patterns, and ii) these representations can serve
as a basis for generating accurate expectations about the
visual and semantic characteristics the instances of its
referent are likely to have. Consequently, if it would be
possible to access a frame prior to an extensive pattern
analyis of a scene or object, then this could substantially
reduce the time and effort required for the recognition of
that scene or object. This because such access would provide
a frame of reference for generating expectations that can
constrain the universe of all possible pattern tests to the
subset of those that are most likely to lead to a coherent
interpretation of the pattern at hand.
According to Friedman, it is precisely a third general
property of frames which enables this kind of access.
Specifically, this property is that frames (as a consequence
of the abstract representational format they employ -
Fischler, 1978-) need to specify their referents in a rela-
tive fashion. For this purpose they draw upon a varied
repertoire of physical and semantic relations (e.g. probabi-
lity of co-occurence, relative size and location, part-
structure, properties, class membership, etc.). This aspect
of frames is illustrated in Figure 1 which represents (part
of) what a 'face-frame' could look like.
The important thing to note about this frame representa-
tion of a face is that it not only stipulates overall face
properties (i.e. shape but others like for instance color or
dimensionality may be added) . Indeed, it also makes explicit
the face's internal and external structure by defining it as
having parts (eyes, nose and mouth) which each have pro-
perties of their own as well as a particular size, location
person
value
<0>
Figure 1. Representation of a 'face-frame' according to
Palmer (1975).
-the vector symbols- and orientation relative to the face,
and as being a part of a person with a particular size,
location and orientation relative to that person. Further-
more, it should be noted that each argument in a frame can
itself be considered to be the referent of another
frame, which allows for the organization of frames into
systems representing scenes and their components at multipl
levels of abstraction or globality (Hanson & Riseman, 1978;
McArthur, 1982; Palmer, 1975). With respect to the issue o
frame access this implies that a particular frame can be
accessed and constrain further processing either on the
basis of a partial or lower-level analysis of a pattern
instance of its referent, or on the basis of expectations
generated by frames representing the visual and semantic
context of its referent.
In order to examine the validity of this frame theory of
scene perception, Friedman outlined and tested its implica-
tions for object identification in scenes. Specifically,
she proposes that scenes are rarely encountered out of
context and that consequently the appropriate scene-frame
will generally be accessed prior to the actual viewing of
the scene. Since this scene-frame specifies the scene's
prototypical internal structure (i.e. objects and background
components that typically appear in the scene as well as
relations that usually hold between them) its activation
will generate expectations about what objects are likely to
be present in the scene and what the typical features of
these objects are. Given the fact that the object repre-
sentations activated in this manner are arguments in a
global scene-frame rather than frames which are fully ex-
panded at the object level, they will specify only those
object features which need to be detected in addition to the
available contextual information in order to establish the
presence of the object in question in that scene. Specifi-
cally, Friedman contends that global object features (e.g.
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shape, dimensionality, texture, etc.) are sufficient for
this purpose. Consequently, she claims, the identification
of an object in a scene it is likely to appear in, is gene-
rally based on a rapid and resource-inexpensive detection of
its global features suggested by the previously activated
frame for that scene. Alternatively, if an object is un-
likely to appear in a given scene the prior activation of
the corresponding scene-frame is to no avail and the object
will have to be identified on the basis of a slower and more
resource-demanding interaction between a more detailed
feature analysis and a frame which is fully expanded at the
object level of representation.
In order to test this hypothesis, Friedman presented
subjects with two series of pictures. The first contained
line drawings of scenes which each were shown for 30 sec
after the subjects had been cued with the general theme of
the scene in order to activate the hypothesized scene-frame.
During the viewing of these scenes eye movements were re-
corded. The second series contained the same scenes along
with distractor versions in which individual objects had
been altered, relocated, substituted or deleted. Prior to
the viewing of the first set, subjects were informed that
they would have to be able to distinguish the scenes they
were about to see from new scenes in which, for example,
only a small object detail would be different. For all ob-
jects presented in the pictures, ratings of their a priori
probability of appearance in the scene had been collected
prior to the experiment.
With regard to the nature of object pattern recognition
processes, Friedman predicted two things in this experiment.
First, under the assumption that the duration of the first
fixation on an object (FFD) reflects the time needed to
encode and identify an object, she expected that the hypo-
thesized difference between rapid global feature detection
and time-consuming detailed feature analysis should be
reflected in longer first fixations on improbable than on
probable objects. Second, she predicted that this dif-
ference should also lead to superior memory for the details
of improbable objects and that consequently distractors in
which improbable objects had been slightly altered should be
discriminated more accurately from the original scenes.
An analysis of the recorded eye movement patterns and
recognition data confirmed both predictions. Apparently,
this supports the theory that placing an object in a consis-
tent scene does indeed alter the object's pattern recogni-
tion from a data-driven process of detailed feature analysis
to a schema-driven process of global feature detection.
It is important to note however, that this can only be
maintained if the FFD-dif ferences can unambiguously be
interpreted as a direct reflection of this qualitative
change in pattern recognition processes. This because the
finding of superior memory for details of improbable objects
does not constitute a sufficient basis for inferring such a
change. Indeed, Friedman also found that subjects were less
successful in recognizing distractor scenes in which pro-
bable Objects had been completely deleted or substituted by
another object rather than merely altered in some detail.
While this suggests that scene information is memorized in
reference to a schema-like representation of that scene
(i.e. episodic memory for a given scene appears to include
only its general theme and those scene elements which de-
viate from the already stored schema)
, it also indicates
that, regardless of the amount of detail in which a probable
object has been patten analyzed, this information is less
likely to enter episodic scene memory than is the case for
improbable objects. It follows then that if one wishes to
maintain that this study clearly supports the notion of
schema-mediated qualitative differences in the pattern
recognition processes underlying probable and improbable
object identification, one should be able to regard the
FFD-differences as sufficient proof of this. This however,
does not appear to be a self-evident matter since Henderson,
Pollatsek, and Rayner (1987, 1988) reported a series of
experiments suggesting a quite different explanation of
these FFD-differences.
Specifically, these authors found that foveal viewing of
a single object prior to making a saccade to a semantically
related extrafoveally located target object, facilitated the
target's identification (as measured by both naming latency
and FFD) when it in turn was fixated. Clearly, since this
effect was observed using arrays of isolated objects rather
than coherent, expected scenes, Friedman's theory can not
adequately explain its appearance. Rather, Henderson et al.
propose, the effect can be interpreted as reflecting the
operation of an automatic object-to-object priming process,
i.e. a spreading of activation in a network of individual
object representations.
It is clear that this priming mechanism is in need of
further specification. Specifically, it still remains to be
determined at which level of representation it operates (the
distinction Kroll and Potter (1984) make between a form-spe-
cific object lexicon and an amodal conceptual store seems
particularly relevant here)
. in addition, it is not clear
yet what the precise nature of its influence is, i.e. does
it primarily affect visual object processing or accessing of
the object's conceptual identity? In spite of these theore-
tical questions however, there are sufficient grounds for
assuming that the inter-object priming mechanism could very
well serve as an alternative to Friedman's explanation of
the FFD-differences she observed in full scenes.
First, as Henderson et al. point out, it seems quite
reasonable to argue that objects appearing in the same scene
tend to be semantically related. In addition, there appears
to be evidence for the idea that a pattern of consecutive
fixations on different objects (which, judging from the
Henderson et al. research, is a necessary condition for ob-
taining inter-object priming) is not an exclusive charac-
teristic of visual exploration in arrays of isolated ob-
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jects. That objects also constitute the perceptually most
relevant fixation locations in natural scenes, has been
suggested in research by Antes, Singsaas, and Metzger (1978)
and Metzger and Antes (1983). These authors demonstrated
that object processing is quicker and more complete when the
objects are brought into foveal vision, while the processing
of setting and background information is most efficient in
extrafoveal vision. In view of these considerations, it
does not appear to be unreasonable to raise the question
whether priming at the level of individual object repre-
sentations rather than generating object identity hypotheses
at the level of global scene schemas, underlies the shorter
identifcation times Friedman reported for probable objects.
A study which seems to provide evidence directly relevant
to this question is presented by Antes and Penland (1981).
In this experiment a direct comparison was made between eye
movement patterns of subjects looking at a full scene ('high
context' or HC-condition) or at a 'low context' (LC) version
of that scene, i.e. at an array of isolated objects con-
structed by simply removing all background and some of the
objects present in the full scene. Two of the objects
appearing in both HC- and LC-displays had a priori been
rated as being highly improbable in the HC-display and were
designated as improbable targets. From the remaining ob-
jects appearing in both displays (which all had been rated
as probable) two were designated as probable targets. Sub-
an
jects saw each display for 4 seconds in preparation of
object recognition test immediately following each display.
Guided by Friedman's theory and the additional assumption
that complete and coherent natural scenes contain global
contextual information which is extracted very rapidly and
provides immediate access to the corresponding scene schema,
Antes and Penland made two predictions which may be directly
relevant to the schemas versus priming issue. First, they
expected the global contextual information in the HC-dis-
plays to lead to scene schema activation. As a result,
FFD's on probable targets in those displays were predicted
to be shorter than those on the same objects in the LC-dis-
plays, where no contextual information was available to
activate the appropriate scene schema. Secondly, they
predicted that in the HC-displays only, saccades towards
probable targets would be longer than those towards im-
probable targets, reflecting a greater useful field of view
for the probable objects. Since Antes and Penland do not
clearly outline the rationale underlying this second predic-
tion, I assume that they based it on the idea that the
detection of global object features specified in an ac-
tivated scene schema, can occur further in extrafoveal
vision and more compellingly suggests the presence of an
object than is the case for data-driven recovery of detailed
object features. Consequently, since objects appear to be
the preferred fixation locations in natural scenes, one
could indeed argue that probable objects will elicit sac-
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cades over a greater distance than improbable objects.
Obviously, such an effect should not be expected in the
LC-displays where scene schema activation is assumed to be
absent
.
An analysis of eye movement patterns showed no signifi-
cant probability-related FFD-dif ferences in either the LC-
or HC-displays, but did reveal that while the FFD's for
improbable targets were unaffected by context, those for
probable targets were significantly shorter in the HC- than
in the LC-displays. Secondly, it was found that mean sac-
cadic amplitude was not affected by target probability in
the LC-displays, but was significantly greater for probable
than for improbable targets in the HC-displays.
At first sight, these findings appear to be quite consis-
tent with the notion that global scene schema activation
rather than inter-object priming underlies probability-rela-
ted differences in ease of object identification in scenes.
A first observation causing problems for the priming ap-
proach seems to be the absence of a priming effect in the
LC-displays. Since the Henderson et al. (1987, 1988)
findings seem to be reliable -priming between semantically
related objects surfaced in each of their experiments as
well as in previous research (e.g. Huttenlocher & Kubicek,
1983)-, this seems to suggest that the assumption that ob-
jects appearing in the same scene are generally semantically
related is incorrect. However, before concluding from this
that inter-object priming has no explanatory validity with
regard to the context-sensitivity of object identification
in scenes, there is one important consideration to be made,
specifically, it appears to be quite possible that, due to
differences in the makeup of LC- and HC-displays, priming of
probable targets only occurred in the latter type of dis-
plays. As a result of a much smaller total number of ob-
jects and a substantially larger proportion of improbable
objects in the LC-displays, the frequency with which the
fixation of a probable target was preceded by a fixation on
another probable object can safely be assumed to have been
considerably lower in the LC- than in the HC-displays.
Obviously, this could within the confines of the priming
model, explain the FFD-dif ferences observed in this study.
As for determining the extent to which the saccadic
amplitude findings necessitate the conclusion that global
scene schemas drive individual object identification in
scenes, the situation is somewhat more complicated.
First, it is not entirely certain whether the greater
saccadic amplitude for probable targets in the HC-displays
does indeed indicate that the presence of these objects can
in general be detected at greater distances. Indeed, the
effect does not appear to be very reliable since, in a study
very similar to that by Antes and Penland (1981) , Loftus and
Mackworth (1978) did not find any probability-associated
differences in mean saccadic amplitude prior to target
fixation. According to Antes and Penland however, these
findings do not challenge their theory. They point out that
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the absence of a saccadic amplitude difference could very
well be an artefact attributable to the fact that the im-
probable objects in the Loftus and Mackworth (1978) stimuli
tend to
-stand out- more than the probable objects. Judging
from the stimulus example Loftus and Mackworth present, this
could indeed be the case since here the improbable target
(i.e. an octopus consisting exclusively of curvilinear line
segments) is clearly more visually dissimilar to its context
(a farm scene predominantly made up out of straight lines at
sharp angles) than its probable counterpart (i.e. a trac-
tor)
.
Consequently, it seems that there is indeed some
ground for arguing that in this study easily detectable low
level physical discrepancies between improbable objects and
their context may have compensated for their inferior detec-
tability in extrafoveal vision, which is supposedly demon-
strated in the Antes and Penland (1981) experiment.
A second question then is, whether inter-object priming
could account for these detectability-dif ferences as well as
schema theory does. In this respect, I do not consider the
absence of saccadic amplitude differences in the LC-displays
to constitute evidence against the plausibility of such an
account. Apart from the fact that it is not clear whether
any priming occurred here, there also seems no reason to
expect saccadic amplitude differences in this condition,
even if priming were to allow for primed object detection at
greater distances than is the case for unprimed objects.
This because in arrays of isolated objects, every bit of
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extrafoveal information suggests the presence of an object
(and consequently a perceptually relevant fixation loca-
tion)
,
regardless of the degree to which it is compatible
with activated object representations.
As for the saccadic amplitude differences in the HC-dis-
plays, there is some evidence that inter-object priming
could account for them. Using gaze duration as a measure of
target identification time in arrays of isolated objects,
Henderson, Pollatsek, and Rayner (1988) tested explicitly
for the overadditive effect of foveal prime and extrafoveal
target preview which one would expect if priming were to en-
hance extrafoveal target processing. Their results revealed
that having a related object in the fovea did indeed enhance
the amount of facilitation derived from an extrafoveal
preview beyond what can be expected on the basis of a mere
additivity of priming and preview effects. Admittedly, a
comparison of these results with those of a similar analysis
in their first series of experiments (Henderson et al.,
1987) , indicates that this enhancement of extrafoveal target
processing is contingent upon extensive processing of the
foveal prime (i.e. explicit identification and memoriza-
tion) . Consequently, one could argue that this finding may
not reflect a process characteristic for all situations
involving real-world scene perception. However, it does
clearly indicate that inter-object priming could be at the
basis of the saccadic amplitude differences in the Antes and
Penland (1981) study, in which subjects were explicitly
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required to memorize scenes in anticipation of an object re-
cognition test.
Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, it appears to be a rea-
sonable conclusion that none of the evidence reported here,
unequivocally indicates that context-consistent object
identification in scenes is based on a concept-driven detec-
tion of global object features specified in a global scene
schema activated prior to or during the earliest stages of
scene perception. Indeed, all of the observed effects can
equally well be accounted for by the assumption that data-
driven access to an object representation primes related
object representations, thus reducing the thresholds for
establishing a match between them and the object features
recovered in a further data-driven analysis of the image.
While it is clear that this priming process still needs
some further specification and research, it does seem to
hold the promise of a simpler and more powerful account of
context effects on object identification, than what can be
provided by a theory centered around the notion of global
scene schemas. Indeed, it avoids the problem -posed by the
Antes and Penland (1981) findings- of having to outline a
theory on how the appropriate scene schema is very rapidly
activated in the absence of clear scene expectations (see
Biederman (1981, 1988) for some speculative notes on this
topic)
.
In addition, it accounts for context effects in
both natural scenes and arrays of isolated objects, enlar-
ging its explanatory scope relative to that of schema
theory
.
However, before this can be taken to provide sufficient
grounds for entirely dismissing the schema approach to this
domain, it is necessary to examine a second strain of
research claiming that global scene-schemas play a major
role in the identification of individual objects in scenes.
Specifically, the following section of this chapter will be
devoted to a discussion of the possibility that object
identification in scenes does not only involve pattern
recognition of the object itself, but is also based on the
use of global scene schemas which allow for the extraction
of object-diagnostic information from an object's spatial
relations to the scene it appears in.
This discussion is important since it is quite clear
that, contrary to what is the case for an approach centered
around global scene schemas, inter-object priming can not
explain effects of spatial contextual information on object
perception. Consequently, any evidence for context effects
of spatial scene-structure would invalidate inter-object
priming and endorse scene schema ativation as the central
notion in a complete account of the context-sensitivity of
object identification in real-world scenes.
22
'^^^ ^^^^ gpatia^obiect-cnn^o^^ in_nivLLM
Identification in Ro^t.oo
Based on an analysis of what characterizes the appearance
of objects in coherent natural scenes, several authors have
argued that like an object's pattern characteristics its
relation to the scene it appears in provides information
about the object's identity (Biederman, 1981; Biederman,
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Klatsky, Teitelbaum, Mezza-
notte, & Biederman, 1981)
.
First, they point out, the appearance of objects in
scenes will typically reflect their fundamental physical
nature, i.e. the fact that they are entities with a certain
mass and density. Their resulting susceptibility to gravity
and incapability to occupy the same position their sur-
roundings occupy, is directly evident in a general tendency
for objects to appear supported by some surface and cause
occlusions in the scene they appear in. Consequently,
Biederman and his colleagues argue, two object-context
relations can be identified (i.e. Support and Interposi-
tion ) , which for any object in any natural scene provide in-
formation with regard to its general physical identity.
Secondly, these authors claim, the appearance of objects
in natural scenes has several additional characteristics
which allow for the definition of three more object-context
relations which also hold for any object in any coherent
scene, but provide more specific information pertaining to
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the semantic identity of objects. Specifically, the cha-
racteristics involved are i) the fact that objects are ty-
pically found in some scenes and not in others, ii) the
tendency for objects to occupy privileged positions in the
scenes they are likely to be found in, and iii) the exis-
tence of typical and stable size ratios between objects
appearing in the same scene. One can therefore argue that
Probability
,
Position and Size relations can be defined
which allow for the formation of hypotheses about an ob-
ject's conceptual identity on the basis of global and/or
local interpretations of the scene it appears in (i.e.
interpretations concerning the scene's global theme and/or
the identity of other objects appearing in it) .
Clearly, this characterization of the appearance of
objects in natural scenes suggests that the research dis-
cussed in the first section may only have captured part of
the context-sensitivity of object identification by ex-
clusively focusing on the effects of purely conceptual
aspects of context (i.e. individual object probability in a
scene or semantic relatedness between consecutively attended
objects) on object pattern recognition. Specifically, the
question is raised here whether the spatial structure in-
herent in natural scenes does not provide a contextual
definition of an additional set of relational object fea-
tures (i.e. Support . Interposition . Size and Position ) which
are taken into account during object identification.
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Before examining the evidence relevant to answering this
question, it should be pointed out that the distinction
between conceptual and spatial contextual aspects, should
not be confounded with the physical-semantic distinction
Biederman et al. proposed. The former distinction separates
Probability from Support, Interposi ti nn
, size and Position
on the basis of differences in the source this contextual
information is drawn from (i.e. the scene's conceptual
interpretation versus the scene's spatial layout). The
latter distinction however, separates Support and Interposi-
tion from Probability, Size and Position on the basis of a
difference in the kinds of preliminary scene processing
required to use these relations as a basis for object iden-
tification. Specifically, this distinction reflects the
fact that while object size and position can be encoded from
a scene prior to its semantic interpretation, they only
(like object probability) become distinctive object features
by virtue of the object's presence in a particular scene.
Consequently, this information requires a semantic inter-
pretation of the scene in order to be used as a basis for
object identification. As for support and interposition,
this is not the case since they are characteristic for any
object, no matter what scene it appears in. As a result,
they merely need to be determined in a physical 3D-parse of
the scene in order to reveal the aspect of object identity
they carry information about (i.e. its fundamental physical
nature). As will be explained below, Biederman et al.'s use
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Of this distinction plays a crucial role in the theoretical
conclusions they have drawn from the experiments which I
will discuss presently.
In these experiments (Biederman, 1981; Biederman,
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982), subjects were asked to
determine whether a pre-named target object had been pre-
sent at a specific position in a tachistoscopically pre-
sented line drawing of a scene. Scenes were exposed for 150
msec and were followed by a mask containing a dot, which
indicated the position of the object the subject had to
decide about whether or not it was the pre-named target. On
half of the trials the target did indeed appear at the cued
position while on the other half some other object was
presented there. The variable of interest was the degree to
which the appearance of the object at the cued position con-
formed to the five object-context relations defined above.
In a Base condition the object violated none of its typical
relations to the scene it was presented in. In various
Violation conditions however, one, two or three of five
possible infractions on these relations (i.e. the object
floated, passed through its background, was improbable, ap-
peared in an inappropriate position or size) , were intro-
duced.
According to Biederman et al., speed and accuracy of the
subject's responses in this experiment can be regarded as a
measure of the perceptibility of the object at the cued
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position. Consequently, they claim, the finding of viola-
tion costs in any of the Violation conditions (i.e. a
decrease in response speed and accuracy relative to the Base
condition) would indicate that the violated relations con-
stitute part of the information normally used in identifying
objects in scenes.
Against the background of this logic three main results
have been obtained in these studies. First, all manipulated
object-context relations appeared to provide contextual
information used for object identification in scenes since
violation costs were incurred for each one of them (with the
exception of Interposition which produced no violation costs
at all)
.
Second, as more pieces of misleading contextual
information were introduced, the perceptibility of the
object they pertained to decreased. This was suggested by a
clear increase of miss rates and correct reaction times
along with a very slight but significant increase in false
alarm rates, as the number of simultaneous relational viola-
tions went up from zero to three. Third, based on an in-
spection of the relative size of the violation costs in-
curred for the various types of violations, it was found
that i) with the exception of Interposition
.
spatial con-
textual information (i.e. Support , Size and Position ) had at
least as much of an effect on object identification as
conceptual contextual information does (i.e. Probability )
,
and ii) physical relations (i.e. Interposition and Support )
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do not have a stronger effect on object identification than
semantic relations do (i.e. Probability, size an Position).
Much along the lines laid out by Friedman (1979) and
Antes and Penland (1981), Biederman and colleagues have
interpreted these results as indicating that the first 150
ins of scene viewing are sufficient to activate a global
scene schema, which contains an integrated representation of
both the conceptual and spatial structure of the scene.
Based on this schema activation, object identity hypotheses
are generated which are verified in the viewed scene by
means of a search for the spatial and featural characteris-
tics the schema specifies for each object it includes. To
the extent that scene and schema information are compatible,
this will result in rapid and accurate object identifica-
tion, while incompatibilities between them will cause the
object identification process to be slower and more
error-prone.
As was already pointed out, the evidence for effects of
spatial violations clearly seems to favor this theory over
an inter-object priming account of context effects on object
identification in scenes. In addition, Biederman and col-
leagues claim that the effects of semantic violations cha-
racterize most prominent models of visual object perception
(e.g. Guzman, 1969; Hoffman & Richards, 1985; Marr, 1978 and
1982; Waltz, 1975) as inadequate for modeling more than the
perception of un-anticipated, isolated objects. Specifical-
ly, they argue that these theories are flawed in their
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description of object perception as exclusively based on the
data-driven and pre-conceptual recovery of the object's
structural features from the image. if this were indeed a
correct view, Biederman et al. point out, one could perhaps
expect effects of the physical violations since they might
interfere with parsing the object from the image, but one
certainly should not find effects of semantic violations.
Since the results showed no effects of Interposition and
only a small effect of Support , while all the semantic
relations did produce substantial violation costs, they
conclude that bottom-up accounts of object perception should
be reserved for the rare cases in which object-context re-
lations are either inappropriate or absent.
While these conclusions may appear to be quite in-
evitable, it should be pointed out that there are a number
of problems associated with this research, which raise
serious doubts about their validity.
The main problem that should be mentioned is that the
response speed and accuracy recorded in this experiment may
not at all reflect the perceptibility of the object at the
cued position, but rather may measure the subject's degree
of uncertainty in post-perceptually deciding whether this
object could indeed have been the pre-named target object.
Specifically, what I want to argue is that a 100-150 ras
masked exposure of a scene will frequently be insufficient
to succeed in a data-driven recovery of the structural
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features of individual objects from the image. Consequent-
ly, if object identification is primarily based on such
recovery, subjects in the Biederman experiments will often
have to resort to educated guesses as to whether cued and
pre-named objects were one and the same. m order to guide
these guesses, subjects not only have available their a
priori knowledge about the pre-named target, but they can
also be assumed to have at their disposal some information
about the image they just saw. Specifically, as Antes,
Penland, and Metzger (1981) and Antes, Mann, and Penland
(1981) demonstrated, 100-150 ms scene exposures can be
sufficient to get some idea of the general theme or setting
depicted in the scene. In addition, while detailed structu-
ral features of the cued object may not have been recovered
during the scene's exposure, this could be the case for some
of its gross spatial properties (i.e. relative size and
position in the scene) which have been shown to be encoded
very rapidly and prior to object identity (e.g Breitmeyer &
Ganz, 1976; Kosslyn, 1987; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). I
should immediately point out that the relative size and
position I refer to, should not be confused with the seman-
tic object-context relations Size and Position which Bieder-
man et al. defined. I use these terms only to refer to
strictly pre-conceptually detectable object characteristics
(i.e. proportion of the scene's visual angle occupied by the
object, its distance to the scene's ground plane, its near-
ness and position relative to other objects)
.
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Based on a comparison between these two types of con-
textual informa-tion and their a priori knowledge about the
pre-named target object, subjects can in my opinion generate
post-perceptual guesses about whether or not the cued and
pre-named object were the same, which will lead to the
response patterns which Biederman and colleagues interpreted
as reflecting variations in perceptibility of the cued
object.
For the trials on which the target is present, this
post-perceptual comparison will namely produce evidence
against a "yes, the cued object was the target" response
whenever a violation of Probability
,
size
. Position or
Support is introduced. For instance, deriving the theme
"kitchen" from a scene will increase the subject's uncer-
tainty about deciding that some unidentified 'blob' in that
scene was a wheelbarrow. An uncertainty which will increase
even further when the blob occupied only a small portion of
the scene, was located at a great distance of the scene's
ground plane and did not appear anywhere near to another
potentially support-providing surface. Consequently, one
can expect that as more of these violations are introduced,
the subject's uncertainty will tend to grow and he will both
take more time to finally say "yes" and be less likely to
respond "yes" at all (resulting in the observed increase of
miss rates and correct reaction times as the number of
violations goes up)
.
However, for the trials on which not the target but some
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other object was present at the cued location, a systematic
change in the subject's Base condition uncertainty should
not be expected in the Violation conditions. On those
trials, the violations do not pertain to the pre-named
target and a post-perceptual comparison of contextual infor-
mation and a priori target knowledge should therefore be
largely non-informative and irrelevant to task performance.
Consequently, what one would expect is an essentially iden-
tical performance level for the catch trials across the Base
and Violation conditions. Note that Biederman et al.'s
(1982) finding of a very slight but significant increase in
false alarm rates as more violations are introduced, can
hardly be viewed as a serious argument for rejecting the
post-perceptual interpretation of the data in favor of an
exlanation in terms of object perceptibility. Indeed, apart
from having failed to replicate this finding (Klatsky, Tei-
telbaum, Mezzanotte, & Biederman, 1981), Biederman and col-
leagues are equally unable to account for it since there is
no obvious reason why, within the framework of their theory,
one would expect subjects to be more likely to claim that an
object is a pre-named target as the object in question
becomes less perceptible.
It follows from this discussion that the post-perceptual
comparison explanation I proposed here, deals with the main
aspects of the Bieder-man data equally well as schema theory
does. In fact, when we consider some of the more detailed
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results it turns out that it may even be preferable.
A first argument to this effect is that Biederman et al.
found that false alarm rates were consistently higher for
catch trials on which the pre-named target was probable to
appear in the scene, than for catch trials on which this was
not the case. Obviously, this is completely in line with
the post-perceptual comparison hypothesis while it poses
problems to the Biederman et al. interpretation. Specifi-
cally, this finding implies that knowledge associated with
the individual target named before scene exposure plays an
important role in determining the subject's response. The
question then becomes to what extent one can still maintain
that responses in this experiment reflect influences of
knowledge contained in a global scene schema activated
during the very first stages of scene viewing.
Secondly, there is the total absence of an effect of
Interposition violations. Following the Biederman et al.
logic, this implies that a violation which thoroughly dis-
turbs an object's featural structure has no effect what-
soever on that object's perceptibility. While one could
certainly argue, as Biederman does, that this only lends ad-
ditional support to the notion that in scenes relational
object features play a much more important role in object
identification than structural object features do, I feel
rather hesitant in accepting this interpretation. The
problem is that it presupposes that relational object fea-
tures are generally sufficient to uniquely and correctly
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specify an object's identity, which I think is at the least
a questionable assumption. The post-perceptual explanation
however, predicts this absence of Interposition effects
without assuming this. Specifically, it starts out from the
idea that 100-150 ms scene exposures are generally insuffi-
cient to recover an object's featural structure, which
logically entails that disturbances of this structure should
have little effect on later decisions concerning the ob-
ject's identity. I therefore see an additional reason here
to be more favorable towards this explanation of the Bieder-
man et al. results.
A final problem that should be mentioned, concerns the
effects that were obtained for the multiple Violation condi-
tion which included simultaneous violations of Probability
and Size. Specifically, the problem is that in this condi-
tion violation costs were higher than those obtained for the
condition in which Probability only was violated. Within
the framiework of Biederman et al.'s theory this is quite an
inexplicable finding since it implies that a global schema
pertaining to a specific scene contains knowledge about the
typical size relations that hold between that scene and all
objects that typically do not appear in it. Obviously, this
is a rather unlikely situation and an alternative explana-
tion needs to be offered. Clearly, the post-perceptual
comparison hypothesis is a plausible candidate here.
Indeed, even if apprehension of the scene's global theme
suggests that the target was improbable to be in it, sub-
34
jects will still be able to deterraine whether the relative
visual angle occupied by the blob at the cued position
conforms to what can be expected if the target should be
placed in that particular scene.
Conclusion
Based on the above discussion of the research by Bieder-
man and colleagues, it appears safe to conclude that no
irrefutable evidence has been presented for the theory that
spatial scene-structure has a perceptual effect on object
identification in real-world scenes. Consequently, the
Probability effect discussed in the first section of this
chapter thusfar appears to be the only reliable indication
of contextual effects on object identification.
Two alternative explanations have been offered for this
phenomenon : one centered around mandatory top-down influ-
ences originating in a rapidly activated global scene-speci-
fic schema; and one based on an automatic priming process
operating between individual representations of semantically
related objects, thus reducing thresholds for data-driven
pattern recognition and identification of primed objects in
the image. While it was indicated that the latter explana-
tion seems to be preferable because of its greater simplici-
ty and generality, a more direct test of its sufficiency as
an account of the Probability effect in scenes is clearly in
order. Specifically, the remainder of this thesis will
focus on examining some possible constraints on inter-object
priming which, if proven to be essential to this process,
could serve as a basis for testing its validity as a mecha-
nism for explaining scene-context effects on object iden-
tification.
CHAPTER 2
CONSTRAINTS ON INTER-OBJECT PRIMING
Based on the Henderson et al. (1987, 1988) studies, three
possible constraints on priming can be identified which may
be relevant for determining the degree to which priming
could play a central role in scene-context effects.
First, it is possible that priming, to put it in terms of
Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) distinction, only affects
controlled and not automatic processing of the primed ob-
ject. Indeed, in all of the Henderson et al. experiments
the facilitory effect of a related prime was measured con-
tingent upon fixation (i.e. a period of primarily controlled
processing) of the primed object. Even the indications of
facilitated extrafoveal processing found in the gaze dura-
tions for primed objects (Henderson et al., 1988), can be
regarded as an effect on controlled object processing, since
a period of selective extrafoveal attention to the primed
object is very likely to have preceded that object's fixa-
tion (Morrison, 1984) . This present limitation of priming
observations to cases of controlled object processing is
quite interesting since advocates of the schema-approach to
scene-context effects (e.g. Antes & Penland, 1981) have
argued that, due to their contextual facilitation, probable
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Objects in a scene may remain entirely unattended and still
can be identified through automatic feature detection. One
Of the objectives of the present research therefore was to
examine whether priming effects are indeed constrained to
controlled object processing. This was done in order to
determine whether an investigation of the perceptibility of
unattended objects in full scenes can be instrumental for
assessing the validity of a priming account of object proba-
bility effects on object recognition.
A second possible constraint that will be examined is the
apparent necessity for the prime itself to be subjected to
controlled processing in order to have an effect on the
processing of related objects. Using arrays of four iso-
lated objects, Henderson et al. (1987) found the decrease of
the first fixation duration on a target object to be strict-
ly conditional upon the immediately preceding fixation of a
target-related object. The mere presence of other tar-
get-related objects in the array yielded no such effect as
evidenced by the absence of a decrease in first fixation
duration when the target was either the first object to be
fixated in the display or was fixated following the fixation
of an unrelated object. Additional support for this absence
of a 'display-consistency effect' was reported by Henderson
et al. (1988) who found that an object's semantic related-
ness to the array it appeared in did not affect the amount
of benefit derived from its extrafoveal preview.
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AS was the case for the first constraint, this apparent
dependency of prixning effects on controlled prixne processing
suggests that priming may be insufficient to account for
context effects in full scenes. Specifically, if this
second constraint does indeed hold, a strict priming view
would predict that the facilitation of an object's process-
ing in a scene should be a function of its semantic relation
to the previously fixated object while its relation to the
rest of the scene should be of little importance. Concrete-
ly, this would mean that no facilitation should be expected
for probable objects which are fixated as the first object
in a scene or are fixated following the fixation of an
improbable object. The first of these predictions runs
counter to the Klatsky, Teitelbaum, Mezzanotte, and Bieder-
man (1981) claim that a 100 ms scene exposure is sufficient
to produce facilitation for a probable object foveated
during that exposure. The second prediction is contested by
the Antes and Penland (1981) suggestion that probable ob-
jects can be identified extrafoveally even when an im-
probable object is being fixated. Clearly, if priming could
be demonstrated to be strictly conditional upon controlled
prime processing just prior to target processing, an unam-
biguous confirmation of these two claims would indicate the
insufficiency of inter-object priming as an account of
scene-context effects. Taking into consideration that other
authors have claimed that priming can be initiated on the
basis of automatic prime processing (e.g. McCauley, Par-
melee. Sperber, & Carr, 1980), it therefore was decided to
examine the reliability of the Henderson et al. (1987, 1988)
failure to observe display-consistency effects.
The third possible constraint that will be investigated
is more than likely the most important one. Specifically,
probably the main objection which one could formulate
against the idea that priming might underly the facilitation
of probable objects in scenes, is that the results presented
as proof for priming were obtained with groups of objects
selected on the basis of their semantic relatedness. While
Henderson et al. (1987) assume (and quite reasonably I
think) that a probable object in a given scene is more
likely to be semantically related to the other objects in it
than is the case for an object which is improbable in that
scene, one can undoubtedly come up with an impressive list
of non-related objects which are likely to appear in the
same scene (e.g. a toilet and an electric razor in a bath-
room, a fireplace and a television in a living-room, etc.).
In fact, as pointed out in the discussion of the Antes and
Penland (1981) experiment in the first chapter, it is not
impossible that the absence of facilitation for probable
objects in the Low Context condition of that study should be
interpreted as showing that the priming effect is indeed
strictly limited to objects that are clearly semantically
related. Clearly, this suggests that an orthogonal manipu-
lation of an object's probability in a scene and its seman-
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tic relatedness to the other objects in the scene could
provide the necessary data for determing whether priming
Plays any role in object probability effects in scenes, m
order to establish whether this would be a useful strategy,
a third objective of the present research was to systemati-
cally examine the existence of priming effects between
objects selected on the basis of their common likelihood to
appear in a given scene, i.e. on the basis of their episodic
relatedness
,
CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
3 . 1 Experiment 1
3«1«1 Research objectives and approanh
The main objectives of this experiment were to determine
whether inter-object priming could affect automatic process-
ing of a primed object and if so, whether controlled pro-
cessing of the prime would be a necessary condition for this
effect to appear. In other words, this experiment is an
attempt to establish whether the claim (Antes & Penland,
1981; Biederman et al., 1982) that identification of a
probable object in a full real-world scene is facilitated
regardless of whether it or other probable objects are
attended to, could in principle be explained as the result
of an inter-object priming mechanism.
To the best of my knowledge, only one study has been
reported which provides evidence that appears to be directly
relevant to these issues. Specifically, in order to deter-
mine the relative ease with which global scene and in-
dividual object information are processed during the first
glance at a scene. Antes, Penland and Metzger (1981) mea-
sured accuracy of a target object's recognition in a forced
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Choice task following its 100 msec presentation in either a
full scene (High Context) or in an array of isolated objects
(Low Context)
.
By orthogonally manipulating the probability
of appearance of target and distractors in the full scene,
Antes et al. were able to determine that in the High Context
condition subjects primarily responded on the basis of the
scene's global theme (i.e. they showed a strong tendency to
choose the objects with the highest likelihood of
appearance, regardless of whether they actually had been
present in the scene)
.
In the Low Context condition, res-
ponses appeared to be primarily based on what objects the
subjects had actually identified perceptually. That is,
responses (1) were more accurate than in the High Context
condition, (2) showed a clear superiority for objects closer
to the central fixation point and (3) were unaffected by the
manipulation of likelihood. It appears that two conclusions
can be drawn from these results.
First, it is suggested that the global theme of a scene
can be apprehended more quickly than the identity of the
individual objects in it. While this finding certainly is
compatible with the claims advanced in schema-theories of
scene perception, it should be pointed out that it provides
insufficient grounds for assuming that individual object
perception in scenes is inevitably mediated by a quickly
derived global scene interpretation. Following the Reicher
(1969) and Wheeler (1970) rationale this could only have
been inferred from the Antes et al. (1981) data if recogni-
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tion accuracy of probable targets among equally probable
distractors had been significantly better than recognition
accuracy of improbable targets among equally improbable
distractors. while the Antes et al. data appear to indicate
that this was indeed the case, it should be noted that the
recognition accuracy for improbable targets among improbable
distractors was significantly below chance-level performance
which shows major problems in the selection of distractors
for this task. Clearly, this makes it impossible to inter-
pret these data as reliable evidence for a genuine con-
textual facilitation of the perception of probable objects
in scenes.
Second, and more relevant to the present discussion, the
data obtained in the Antes et al. study suggest that here we
may have the prototype of a paradigm which allows for an
assessment of the effects of priming on automatic object
processing. Specifically, what is of interest here is that
accuracy of object recognition in the forced choice task
varied as a function of factors affecting the perceptibility
of the target object -i.e. degree of lateral masking and
visual acuity-. This is indicated by the fact that it was
higher for isolated targets than for targets presented in
scenes, and also higher for targets presented closer to the
central fixation point. The reason why this is interesting
is that these effects surfaced following the 100 ms presen-
tation of an uncued target at an unspecified and generally
extrafoveal position. Under these conditions one can rea-
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m
sonably assume that subjects generally did not succeed
selectively attending to the target during its exposure and
therefore could not engage in its controlled processing.
This then leads to the conclusion that the object recogni-
tion accuracy recorded here is sensitive to genuine percep-
tual differences in the ease with which object information
is acquired through automatic processing, and therefore is
well-suited to measure priming effects on this kind of
processing.
In fact, it could appear as if the Antes et al. (1981)
data for the Low Context condition are already sufficient to
conclude that inter- object priming does not affect automa-
tic object processing since no differences in recognition
accuracy for probable and improbable objects were found in
that condition. However, there are two aspects of this
study which make it impossible to draw this conclusion.
First, all the objects used to construct the Low Context
stimuli were selected on the basis of episodic rather than
semantic relatedness. Obviously, this leads to the problem
that there is no way of determining whether the absence of a
difference between probable and improbable objects should be
interpreted as showing that priming only works between
semantically related objects or simply does not apply to
automatic object processing. Second, the interpretational
problems are even further enhanced when one considers the
fact that there was no systematic manipulation of the infor-
mation appearing in foveal vision during the target's ex-
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trafoveal presentation. Consequently, it is possible that
the third possible constraint on inter object priming (i.e.
that it requires controlled processing of the prime) was
violated as well, which makes it even more difficult to use
the Low Context data as a basis for determing whether or not
priming has any effect on automatic object processing.
Against the background of this analysis of the Antes et
al. (1981) experiment, it was decided to use a modified
version of their paradigm in order to study the role of
inter-object priming in automatic object processing. Speci-
fically, subjects were confronted with a 150 ms, masked
presentation of an array of isolated objects and were then
asked to indicate which one of a set of four objects had
been present in the display. The presented arrays always
contained 5 or 6 objects which could be grouped into two
different "episodic categories", i.e. object groups defined
by the common likelihood of their members to appear in the
same scene. The two categories instantiated in each display
were always selected so that the overlap between them could
be considered to be minimal, i.e. objects selected for their
high likelihood to appear in the one scene were quite un-
likely to also be encountered in the other scene.
Within this basic stimulus structure, two crucial manipu-
lations were introduced. The first manipulation concerned
the nature of the foveal information present while the to-
be-recognized object (henceforth called the target) was
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presented extrafoveally
. m the first type of display
("Foveal Related" conditions) the foveal object was fro. the
same category the target belonged to; in the second type
("Foveal Unrelated" conditions) the foveal object belonged
to the other category instantiated in the array; and in the
third type ("Foveal Absent" conditions) no foveal object was
present at all. The second manipulation pertained to the
nature of the extrafoveal information present during display
exposure. Specifically, by varying the number of target-
related extrafoveal objects in the arrays, several levels of
"Extrafoveal Relatedness" were created. The rationale
behind these manipulations was as follows.
First, it was assumed that a comparison of the accuracy
with which the briefly and extrafoveally presented targets
were recognized in the Foveal Related and Unrelated condi-
tions, should provide information about whether controlled
prime processing can facilitate automatic processing of a
related object. Specifically, if this would indeed be the
case the target should be recognized more accurately in the
Foveal Related conditions. (Note 1)
Second, since the experiment also aimed at examining
possible effects of automatic prime processing , it was
decided to compare target recognition performance across
levels of Extrafoveal Relatedness in Foveal Absent arrays.
Finding an increase in target recognition accuracy as Ex-
trafoveal Relatedness in these arrays increases, would
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Obviously constitute strong evidence for the sufficiency of
automatic prime processing to initiate priming effects,
unfortunately, however, the absence of such an increase
would not allow for an equally clear interpretation since at
least three explanations could be suggested for it. First,
automatic prime processing may elicit no priming effects.
Second, automatic prime processing may only have an effect
conditional upon simultaneous controlled processing of
another prime. In other words, the presence of unattended,
extrafoveal primes may only have an effect if their per-
ceptibility is enhanced by the identification of a foveal
prime. Note that this kind of secondary priming by un-
attended primes has already been suggested in research on
sentence processing (Paap & Newsome, 1981) . Third, auto-
matic prime processing could by itself be sufficient to
elicit priming, but the total absence of foveal load in the
Foveal Absent arrays could provide subjects with such a
high-quality extrafoveal target preview that priming may not
provide any additional benefit (a phenomenon already ob-
served in the naming latency experiments reported by Hender-
son et al.
,
1987)
.
In order to unravel these possible interpretational
problems, a third analysis was planned which involved a
comparison of Foveal Related-Unrelated differences in target
recognition performance at different levels of Extrafoveal
Relatedness. Specifically, if this difference could be
demonstrated to increase when Extrafoveal Relatedness in the
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Foveal Related condition is increased while that in the
Foveal Unrelated condition is decreased, a facilitory effect
of the presence of unattended primes would be indicated, m
addition, if this increased difference would prove to be the
combined result of an increase in target recognition in the
Foveal Related condition and a decrease in the Foveal Unre-
lated condition, automatic prime processing would appear to
be self-sufficient to elicit priming. Alternatively, if the
increased difference would be attributable to a target
recognition increase in the Foveal Related condition only
,
unattended prime effects would prove to be conditional upon
simultaneous foveal prime processing.
To conclude this general description of the experiment, a
few final comments should be made with regard to the em-
ployed measure of target perceptibility.
In order to minimize the possibility for subjects to
selectively attend to the target during its presentation,
targets were uncued and were presented for only 150 ms at an
a priori unspecified extrafoveal location in an array of
objects. In addition (and contrary to the Antes et al.
(1981) experimental situation), each display was followed by
a visual noise mask to prevent subjects from using CRT
after-images or iconic memory to turn their attention to
specific extrafoveal objects in the display. This was an
important control since there are indications (Loftus &
Mackworth, 1978; Antes et al., 1981) that attention tends to
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shift very rapidly towards objects that are episodically
unrelated to the scene or array of objects they appear in.
In the present experiment this would systematically favor
perceptual processing of the extrafoveal objects belonging
to the least represented episodic category in the display,
and thus would obscure any possible priming effects produced
by the manipulations of target-display consistency and
foveal information. While the 150 ms exposure duration was
assumed to be sufficiently short in order to avoid atten-
tional shifts during stimulus presentation, the presence of
both a CRT after-image and an undisturbed iconic representa-
tion of the stimulus could allow for such shifts following
stimulus presentation, which is why the mask was introduced.
Finally, following the mask, subjects were presented with
a set of four object names from which they had to select the
target. Contrary, to what was the case in the Antes et al.
(1981) experiment, the distractors in this set always be-
longed to the same episodic category the target belonged to.
This was done in order to ensure that responses would indeed
reflect the perceptibility of individual targets rather than
a general judgment about which episodic category had been
represented in the display.
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3.1.2 Method
Subjects
16 members of the University of Massachusetts subject
pool participated in the experiment. All of the subjects
had normal vision and did not require corrective lenses for
reading.
Stimuli
To construct the necessary object arrays, 12 3 line
drawings of different objects were used. A large number of
these objects was drawn from the standardized set provided
by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). From this pool, 32
episodic categories of five objects each were assembled and
divided into 16 pairs of non-overlapping categories. In
each of the resulting 16 groups of ten objects, two objects
(one from each category) were designated to be extrafoveal
targets, two others (one from each category) were selected
to serve as foveal primes, and the remaining six were
assigned the role of extrafoveal primes. Where norms were
available, targets, foveal and extrafoveal primes from the
two categories in a given pair were selected to be of com-
parable visual complexity. A complete list of the 16 cate-
gory-pairs is provided in Appendix A.
From each of these 16 pairs, eight different displays
were constructed as schematically illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1. Schematic representation of structure and content
^hr^'^rS^^^ display types. Al through AfandBl t ough B5 denote different objects, with
leJ?er'^nr:^"^"^^P °' object' indicated by thett r and the role of the object (target fovea!prime or extrafoveal prime) indicated by the
DISPLAY la DISPLAY lb DISPLAY la' DISPLAY lb'
A3 B3
A2
Bl 84
Al
A3 B3
B2
Bl A4
Al
A3 33
Bl 34
Al
A3 33
Bl A4
Al
DISPLAY 2a DISPLAY 2b DISPLAY 2a' DISPLAY 2b'
A3 A5
A2
Bl A4
Al
B5 B3
B2
Bl 34
Al
A3 A5
Bl A4
Al
B5 33
Bl 34
Al
In Table 1, alphanumerical combinations "Al" through "A5"
and "Bl" through "B5" represent ten different objects be-
longing to two episodic categories "A" and "B". The numbers
in these symbols indicate the role that was a priori
assigned to the object in question : "1" for targets, "2"
for foveal primes and "3" through "5" for extrafoveal
primes.
As seen in Table 1, the basic display structure consisted
of two targets and three extrafoveal primes placed on the
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corners of an imaginary pentagon. in this manner
inter-Object and object-to-center of display distance was
kept constant in order to (given the subject's fixation on
the display center) equate all objects for lateral masking
and visual acuity effects, within a given pair of episodic
categories, targets always appeared at the same location in
order to maximize comparibility of the target's accuracy of
recognition across display types. Across the 16 category-
pairs, however, targets were rotated through all peripheral
positions in order to ensure that the subjects would not be
able to generate expectations about target positions.
Within the framework of this basic display structure the
nature of the foveal information present at exposure time as
well as the number of extrafoveal primes were manipulated in
order to test the hypotheses outlined in section 3.1.1.
Displays la, lb, 2a and 2b were constructed to examine
Foveal Related-Unrelated differences in target percep-
tibility at various levels of Extrafoveal Relatedness.
Specifically, in displays la and lb, the two targets (Al and
Bl) were presented in a Foveal Related condition (la for Al
and lb for Bl) and a Foveal Unrelated condition (lb for Al
and la for Bl) with a similar, low Extrafoveal Relatedness
in both cases (i.e. one extrafoveal prime in the Foveal
Related condition and two in the Foveal Unrelated condi-
tion) . In displays 2a and 2b, the number of extrafoveal
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primes was increased from one to three in the Foveal Related
condition (2a for Al and 2b for Bl)
, while it was decreased
from two to zero in the Foveal Unrelated condition (2a for
Bl and 2b for Al)
.
Displays la', lb', 2a' and 2b' were constructed to ex-
amine whether unattended prime processing could by itself
affect target perceptibility. By simply removing the cen-
tral objects in displays la, lb, 2a and 2b, these displays
presented the targets at four levels of Extrafoveal Related-
ness. In increasing order of relatedness: displays 2b',
la', lb' and 2a' for the A-target, and displays 2a', lb',
la' and 2b' for the B-target.
In this manner, the eight display types represented in
Table 1 produced eight context conditions in which to be
recognized targets were presented. Table 2 summarizes how
the display types map onto the context conditions for the A
and B-targets.
In order to measure target perceptibility in these eight
context conditions, a choice set of four object names was
assembled for each of the 32 targets used in the experiment.
In addition to the name of the target itself, this set
contained the names of three other objects that did not
appear in the display the target was presented in, but did
belong to the same episodic category the target was a member
of. A complete list of these choice sets is provided in
Appendix B.
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Table 2.
?ab?f?^ ^'^''^'^^ 0 to 3). Display ?ypes (see
TnH^^.i^ ^^^^ context condition arei dicated for A and B-targets separately.
FOVEAL RELATED FOVEAL UNRELATED FOVEAL RELATED FOVEAL UNRFT ATFTi
EXTRAFOVEAL 1 EXTRAFOVEAL 2 EXTRAFOVEAL 3 EXTRAFOVEAL 0
A-taraets : A-taraets : A-taraets :
- display 2a
B-taraets :
- display 2b
A-taraets :
- display 2b
B-taraets :
- display 2a
- display la
B-taraets :
- display lb
- display lb
B-taraets :
- display la
FOVEAL ABSENT FOVEAL ABSENT FOVEAL ABSENT
EXTRAFOVEAL 2
FOVEAL ABSENT
EXTRAFOVEAL 0 EXTRAFOVEAL 1 EXTRAFOVEAL 3
A-taraets :
- display 2b'
B-taraets :
- display 2a'
A-taraets :
- display la'
B-taraets :
- display lb'
A-taraets :
- display lb'
B-taraets :
-display la'
A-taraets :
- display 2a'
B-taraets :
- display 2b'
Finally, in addition to the experimental stimuli, 24 more
arrays of six objects each were constructed to serve as
practice and filler stimuli. While the spatial structure of
these displays was identical to that of the experimental
stimuli, the six objects in them always belonged to six
different episodic categories and the objects designated as
targets were always located in the center of the display.
There were two reasons for introducing these arrays as
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practice and filler stimuli. First, their categorical
heterogeneity could help to discourage subjects from res-
ponding on the basis of general categorical display-consis-
tency impressions instead of on whether or not they actually
saw any of the choice alternatives. Second, the central
location of the targets in them could keep the subjects from
adopting the strategy of covertly shifting their attention
to the peripheral regions of the displays while neglecting
the central area (which would obviously defeat the purpose
of the experiment)
.
Complete lists of these practice and
filler stimuli and their corresponding sets of choice alter-
natives are provided in Appendices C and D.
Apparatus
The object pictures and the mask were entered into a
Hewlett-Packard 2100 computer by means of a Summagraphics
Bit-Pad, and were displayed on a Hewlett-Packard 1300A CRT
with a P-31 phosphor. Over the entire set of objects,
pictures subtended from 1*> to 3® both horizontally and ver-
tically, while the mask subtended 4® by 4®. Inter-object
distance (measured from center to center) and
object-to-display center distance were approximately 6**.
The sets of four object names presented as alternatives in
the forced choice target recognition task, were also dis-
played on the CRT (one below the other) , with the target
name's position rotated through the list across trials.
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Procedurf>
Upon arrival, subjects were seated 46 cm from the CRT
with their head held in position by a chin and forehead rest
in order to keep viewing distance constant and eliminate
head movements. Subjects were told that they would see a
series of brief presentations of object groups, which all
would be followed immediately by the presentation of a set
of four object names. One of these names, they were told,
would always correspond to an object that had actually been
present in the display they just saw, while the other three
would not. Their task then was to pick out the name of the
object that had indeed been in the display. Each subject
received a total of 56 trials : 4 practice trials and 32
experimental trials with the 20 filler trials inserted at
fixed positions between them. Each trial consisted of the
following events: First, a cross was presented in the center
of the display and the subjects were instructed to fixate
it. Subsequently, an array of objects was displayed for 150
ms, immediately followed by a 250 ms presentation of the
mask at each of the locations where an object had just
appeared. Following the offset of the mask, a set of object
names were displayed as choice alternatives and the sub-
ject's choice was recorded by the experimenter. No feedback
was given before the end of the experiment which lasted 15
to 20 minutes.
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Design
As pointed out above, the measure of interest in this
experiment was the accuracy of target recognition in each of
the eight context conditions presented in Table 2. Two
restrictions had to be taken into account in obtaining this
measure. The first one was that subjects could not be
presented with the same array of objects more than once,
since previous research on the effects of extrafoveal primes
(Paap & Newsome, 1981) showed these effects to be a function
of the subject's familiarity with the stimuli. The second
one was that subjects could not be presented with the same
set of choice alternatives more than once, in order to avoid
effects of response strategies (e.g. a subject could attempt
to show consistency by always choosing the same alternative
regardless of whether or not he actually saw it) . In view
of these restrictions, it was impossible to present each
subject with the 256 trials (16 pairs of episodic object-
categories X 2 sets of choice alternatives for each of these
category-pairs X 8 different displays for each category-
pair)
,
which were required to probe all targets in all
context conditions. Obviously, this ruled out the pos-
sibility of measuring accuracy of target recognition in
terms of the number of subjects that correctly recognized a
particular target in a particular context condition. It was
therefore decided to measure accuracy of target recognition
for a particular context condition in terms of the number of
targets in that condition that had been correctly recognized
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across subjects.
in order to do so, the 16 types of target recognition
trials (which were produced by the combination of two sets
of choice alternatives with eight different displays for
each category-pair) were grouped into eight pairs of maxi-
mally discrepant target recognition trials. Specifically,
the two trials in each pair always differed in terms of the
target that was probed for (the A-target in one trial and
the B-target in the other)
,
the foveal content of the dis-
play presented during the trial (a foveal object was present
on one trial and absent in the other)
, and the identity of
the non-target objects in the display (only one of these
objects was the same in the two trials) . By assigning the
eight trial-pairs for a given category-pair to 8 different
subjects, and repeating this procedure for all 16 category-
pairs (with the restriction that across category-pairs each
subject should receive all types of target recognition tasks
equally often) , each subject was assigned a series of 32
trials (individually randomized for each subject)
,
while
across subjects all 32 targets were probed once in each of
the 8 context conditions. Since 16 subjects participated in
the experiment, the whole procedure could be replicated and
64 data-points (i.e. two for each target) were available to
compute the proportion correct in each of the eight context
conditions.
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3.1.3 Result;
A first result that needs to be mentioned is that on the
20 filler trials (where the target was located in the center
of the display) all subjects performed at a very high level
of accuracy
: proportion correct ranged from .75 to l.oo
with an average of .85 (chance-level performance being
.25).
Clearly, this suggests that subjects were unlikely to have
adopted a systematic strategy of shifting their attention to
the peripheral regions of the displays, which would have run
counter to the objectives of the experiment.
The results pertaining to the accuracy of target recogni-
tion in the eight context conditions, are presented in Table
3.
Table 3. Proportion of targets correct per Context
condition.
FOVEAL RELATED FOVEAL UNRELATED FOVEAL RELATED FOVEAL UNRELATED
EXTRAFOVEAL 1 EXTRAFOVEAL 2 EXTRAFOVEAL 3 EXTRAFOVEAL 0
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
.250 .343 .265 .406
FOVEAL ABSENT FOVEAL ABSENT FOVEAL ABSENT FOVEAL ABSENT
EXTRAFOVEAL 0 EXTRAFOVEAL 1 EXTRAFOVEAL 2 EXTRAFOVEAL 3
(V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
.421 .437 .390 .406
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The first thing to note here is that the comparison be-
tween the Foveal Related (I and III) and Unrelated (ii and
IV) conditions does not show superior target recognition
performance in the former, as would be expected if con-
trolled prime processing facilitated automatic perceptual
processing of related objects. m fact, the difference was
clearly in the opposite direction since the overall propor-
tion correct in the Foveal Related conditions (i.e.
.257) is
significantly smaller [Z = 2.01, p < .05] than that in the
Foveal Unrelated conditions (i.e.
.374).
Contrary to this clear indication of an, albeit unex-
pected, Foveal Relatedness effect on target recognition
performance, no such indication appears to be present for an
Extrafoveal Relatedness effect. In the data for the Foveal
Absent conditions (proportions V through VIII), no signi-
ficant differences could be found in the six possible pair-
wise comparisons between these conditions. Obviously, this
finding does not support the hypothesis that unattended
prime processing can by itself facilitate automatic process-
ing of a related object. As mentioned before, however, a
null-effect in these comparisons does not necessarily mean
that Extrafoveal Relatedness can play no facilitory role at
all conditional upon simultaneous Foveal Relatedness and/or
the absence of a high-quality extrafoveal target preview.
Since, however, an insignificant superiority of Foveal Unre-
lated over Foveal Related (i.e. proportion II minus proper-
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tion I, z = 1.157, E > .05) further increases to reach
significance (i.e. proportion IV xninus proportion in, z =
1.718, E < .05) When Extrafoveal Relatedness is decreased in
the Foveal Unrelated condition while it is increased in the
Foveal Related condition, the data quite clearly argue
against any facilitory effect of unattended primes on auto-
matic processing of related objects. To the contrary, the
data for the Foveal Unrelated conditions show a tendency for
performance to decrease as Extrafoveal Relatedness in-
creases. While this tendency does not reach significance
(proportion IV minus proportion II, z =
.739, p > .05) it is
interesting to note that it is consistent with a similar
tendency in the Foveal Absent conditions. Only in the
Foveal Related conditions this pattern did not surface,
which could very well be due to a floor-effect since perfor-
mance in these conditions dropped entirely to chance-level.
Note that this minimal level of performance was only found
in the Foveal Related conditions, while recognition accuracy
in all other conditions was significantly higher than
chance-level (a proportion correct of .338 being sufficient
to reach a .05 significance level).
3.1.4 Discussion
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the data
presented here is that neither controlled nor automatic
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processing of individual objects appear to facilitate pre-a-
ttentive processing of other objects likely to appear in the
same real-world scene. This follows from the failure to
find either l) superior target recognition in the Foveal
Related versus Unrelated conditions, or 2) an increase in
performance as the degree of Extrafoveal Relatedness in-
creases. Naturally, these data do not necessarily imply
that the inter-object priming mechanism observed in previous
studies (e.g. Carr, McCauley, Sperber, & Parmelee, 1982;
Henderson et al. 1987; Reinitz, Wright, & Loftus, 1989) is
restricted to controlled processing of the target object.
In order to draw this conclusion, one would have to be
certain that the absence of facilitory priming effects in
the present experiment was not due to the operationalisation
of prime-target relatedness in terms of episodic rather than
semantic relatedness. However, the data do imply that if
ease of pre-attentive object processing in full scenes could
be demonstrated to be enhanced by the object's likelihood of
appearance in the scene, inter-object priming would provide
an insufficient basis to account for this effect of scene
context
.
The most intriguing aspect of the data however, is not
the failure to find facilitation of targets related to
foveal or extrafoveal primes, but the apparent superiority
of recognition for targets which were not related to these
primes.
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A first explanation one could propose for this phenomenon
is based on the proposition that the featural dissimilarity
between the target and the other objects is greater when
they do not belong to the same episodic object category.
Analagous to what a number of authors have suggested for
semantically related objects (e.g. Carr et al., 1982;
Huttenlocher & Kubicek, 1983; Sperber, McCauley, Ragain, &
Weil, 1979), Biederman (1981) obtained some results indi-
cating that episodically related objects are visually more
alike than unrelated objects. Specifically, Biederman asked
subjects to determine whether a pre-named target object was
present in a briefly exposed (100 ms) array of extrafoveally
located objects. False alarm rates in this task were lower
and unaffected by the number of objects in the display only
when the target did not belong to the episodic category all
the other objects in the display belonged to. Miss rates
however, were similar for both display-consistent and incon-
sistent targets and increased as the number of objects in
the display increased. While Biederman initially inter-
preted these data as evidence for a categorical pop-out
effect -similar to what Egeth, Jonides, and Wall (1972)
found for letters and digits- he later (Biederman, 1982)
stated that they should rather be seen as indicating that
objects from the same episodic category are visually more
alike and therefore more confusable than objects from dif-
ferent categories. In view of these results, one could
argue that in the present experiment, a greater featural
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dissimilarity between unrelated targets and the other ob-
jects may have enhanced their visual distinctiveness. As a
result, their perceptibility and subsequent accuracy of
recognition could have increased directly by making their
features stick out in the visual field, or indirectly by
eliciting pre-saccadic shifts of attention towards these
visually distinct objects.
However, two aspects of the data suggest that this ex-
planation is not quite complete. First, while there was a
slight tendency for a decrease in performance as Extrafoveal
Relatedness (i.e the number of extrafoveal primes) in-
creased, it never reached the level of significance that
would have corroborated the visual dissimilarity hypothesis.
Second, adding a target-related object in the center of a
display did not produce a graceful degradation of target
recognition performance for that display, as one would
expect if the foveal prime would constitute just another
source of visual target-distractor confusability . Rather,
it caused performance to completely drop to chance-level,
which could not be ascribed to an increase in foveal load
(Ikeda & Takeuchi, 1975) since the phenomenon did not occur
when a target-unrelated foveal object was added.
In view of these considerations, it appears to be more
adequate to explain the unrelated target superiority by
assuming that when an object's representation is sufficient-
ly strongly activated, it will prime the representations of
other objects belonging to the same episodic category. If
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one further assumes, that ciii/-k
,
T:na such strong activation of a single
Object representation and the resulting priming of related
representations can only be achieved on the basis of con-
trolled object processing, the observed results can be
explained. Specifically, the chance-level performance for
foveal-related targets can be attributed to insufficiently
large differences in the level of representational activa-
tion between foveal-related objects that were actually in
the display and primed objects that were not. Indeed, this
would result in a set of possible response candidates for
the subsequent forced choice task, which would include the
entire set of response alternatives and therefore would
necessitate the subject to choose at random. For the fo-
veal-unrelated targets, this kind of priming and response
competition between target-related objects should not be
expected if the assumption is correct that controlled object
processing is required for such effects to appear. The
absence of a clear effect of Extrafoveal Relatedness sup-
ports this assumption and suggests that the slight tendency
towards such an effect in the Foveal Unrelated and Foveal
Absent conditions, may in fact be attributable to the iden-
tification of (and subsequent priming by) extrafoveal tar-
get-related objects on a small proportion of the trials.
In conclusion, the present data are taken to, albeit
indirectly, suggest that inter-object priming is not limited
to semantically related objects but also occurs between
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episodically related objects. However, the results also
indicate that if such pricing exists, it does not facilitate
pre-attentive processing of primed objects. This clearly
suggests an approach for unambiguously testing the validity
of inter-object priming as a complete account of effects of
object probability in full scene context.
3 . 2 Experiment 9
3.2.1 Research Objectives and Approach
The first objective of this experiment was to further
explore the superior recognition of unrelated targets in the
Foveal Present conditions in Experiment 1. Specifically,
the question was examined whether this finding reflected a
greater perceptibility of these targets or rather should, as
proposed in the discussion of Experiment 1, be interpreted
as indirect evidence for the operation of a priming process
between episodically related objects.
As mentioned before, the absence of systematic effects of
Extrafoveal Relatedness in the first experiment argued
against the hypothesis that a 'pop-out' effect based on
categorical (Egeth et al., 1972) or featural (Biederman,
1982) dissimilarity could have directly enhanced the per-
ceptibility of the unrelated targets. However, one could
still stress the point that the unrelated target recognition
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was only significantly superior in the displays containing
no other target-related objects (i.e proportion IV in Table
3). Consequently, under the assumption that objects from
different episodic categories do indeed tend to be more
visually dissimilar, one could argue that this indicates the
possibility of a pre-saccadic attentional shift towards
those elements in the periphery of the display which are
visually most dissimilar to the information processed fo-
veally. On this view, one would indeed expect the unrelated
targets to be recognized most accurately in displays in
which such an attentional shift would systematically be
directed towards them, i.e. in the displays in which all
other peripheral objects are related to the foveal object.
In order to determine the validity of this alternative
explanation of the unrelated target superiority, it was
decided to examine one of its possible implications in the
present experiment. Specifically, if featural dissimilarity
between the object in foveal vision and a peripherally
located object were indeed to draw the subjects' attention,
one could expect this attentional shift to be followed by a
saccade towards this dissimilar object. In fact, research
by Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Antes and Penland (1981) and
Antes et al. (1981) does indeed suggest that both in full
scenes and in arrays of isolated objects, peripherally
located objects tend to be fixated earlier in the course of
display exploration when they are episodically unrelated
(and hence featurally dissimilar) to the objects foveated
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during the first fixations on the center of the display,
consequently, it appeared to be worthwile to examine the
scanning patterns of subjects confronted with the Foveal
Present stimuli of Experiment 1, in order to determine
Whether the unrelated target superiority observed for these
stimuli could be attributed to covert attentional shifts
towards these targets.
Clearly, if this analysis of scanning patterns should
reveal that unrelated objects in the periphery of the dis-
plays tend to be fixated earlier, the related-unrelated
differences in Experiment 1 could no longer be interpreted
as a result of response competition caused by a priming
process between episodically related objects. Therefore,
the second objective of Experiment 2 was to more directly
examine the existence of such priming by using a measure
generally believed to directly reflect ease of object iden-
tification (i.e the duration of the first fixation on an
object)
.
Obviously, a decrease in first fixation duration
for a given target object following the fixation of an
episodically related object would lend support to the notion
of a priming process between these objects.
In addition, first fixation duration for targets can also
be analyzed as a function of the simultaneous presence of
other target-related objects which are not attended to prior
to the targets' fixation. In this manner, it can be es-
tablished whether the failure for automatic prime processing
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to facilitate target reo nrrr. ^-i^g i: cognition m Experiment 1, should be
attributed to the pre-attentive nature of the prime pro-
cessing or of the target processing in that task. The
primary reason for examining this question was that its
answer can provide yet another step towards identifying the
kind Of research that is most likely to yield unambiguous
conclusions with regard to the validity of an inter- object
priming explanation of probability effects on object percep-
tion in scenes. Specifically, if the presence of unattended
primes would have no influence on first fixation durations
for the targets, then a priming account of object probabili-
ty effects in scenes would be clearly falsified by any
effects that are not exclusively attributable to the episo-
dic relation between the target and the object fixated just
prior to it. in other words, this would lead to the very
concrete prediction that no facilitation should be found for
probable targets fixated as the first object in a scene, or
for probable targets fixated after attending to an im-
probable object.
It may seem that the last question examined in the pre-
sent experiment has already been answered in the Henderson
et al. (1987, 1988) studies where global target-display
consistency failed to have an effect on the duration of
first target fixations. There is one important reason,
however, why these data do not conclusively rule out the
possibility of an effect of automatic prime processing.
Specifically, as Henderson et al. (1988) already mentioned,
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an effect of automat ir- r»>--ii«« ^i-omar c prime processing presupposes that
visual attention can be unfocused to such an extent that
Object information can be extracted across the entire dis-
play. AS Loftus (1983) argues, this widely distributed
attention may well be a typical characteristic of the first
fixation (s) on a scene, allowing for the detection of some
object features and their spatial locations. While this
proposition finds some support in the cited evidence for
very rapidly occuring systematic saccades towards periphe-
rally located inconsistent objects, Henderson et al. (1988)
argue that their data favor an alternative model of visual
attention. Specifically, while they did find indications
for an extrafoveal preview benefit for targets fixated
following the fixation of a related object, no such benefit
was observed when the target was related to all the objects
in the display except the one fixated just prior to it.
Consequently, they claim, a sequential model of visual
attention seems more appropriate, according to which atten-
tion is only directed towards the position currently being
fixated and the one about to be fixated.
The question which can be raised, however, is whether Hen-
derson et al. did not induce their subjects to distribute
their attention in such a sequential fashion, by imposing a
standard fixation sequence of objects appearing at fixed
positions in displays terminated by the subjects themselves.
It appears to be a reasonable assumption that under these
conditions, there is no need for a wide distribution of at-
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tention and consequently little reason to expect target-
display consistency effects, a fairer test for the possible
existence of effects of automatic prime processing therefore
was required, in which task conditions explicitly favored a
wide distribution of attention.
In order to examine these questions a modified version of
the paradigm employed in Experiment 1 was used. Using
similar arrays of isolated objects, subjects now were al-
lowed to move their eyes away from the center of the display
and fixate one of the peripheral objects. Displays were
terminated and the mask and forced choice task were presen-
ted once a peripheral object had received a first fixation,
or if no such fixation had occurred after 1 sec of exposure.
These exposure time constraints were imposed in order to
induce the subjects to actually move their eyes away from
the display center to the peripheral objects, in addition,
they forced subjects to gather spatially disparate informa-
tion and make a fixation decision in a limited amount of
time, thus favoring an initially wide distribution of atten-
tion. During the entire exposure duration of the displays,
eye movement patterns were recorded in order to control
display termination and collect the necessary data for
testing the hypotheses outlined above.
Specifically, scanning patterns across displays with a
central object should reveal whether peripheral objects
which are not episodically related to that object are selec-
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ted for fixation more freauentiv =.0^i-eque y, as can be expected if
their presumably greater feai-nr-^i •1 ^ u r atural dissimilarity to the
central object does indeed attract attention,
in addition, average first fixation durations for the selec-
ted targets should be shorter when they are Central Related
if priming between episodically related objects does indeed
exist. Finally, if pre-attentive object processing can also
cause such a priming effect, then this should become ap-
parent in a decrease of first target fixation durations with
an increase in Peripheral Relatedness, i.e. in the number of
target-related objects in the periphery of the display.
3.2.2 Method
Subjects
Eight members of the University of Massachusetts subject
pool participated in the experiment. All of the subjects
were familiar with the eye movement registration equipment
used in the experiment and none of them required corrective
lenses for reading.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in this experiment were identical to
those in Experiment 1 except for two minor modifications
which were introduced in order to be able to reliably ana-
lyze the fixation duration data.
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specifically, because fixation durations tend to vary
considerably across individuals (Rayner, 1978), it was
decided to run a completely within-subjects design in order
to control for the variance due to these interindividual
differences. since this necessarily implies longer experi-
mental sessions per subject, display types la- and lb- (see
Table 1) were omitted in order to shorten the experiment.
This had no further implications because the sole purpose of
these display types was to provide intermediate levels of
Peripheral Relatedness. Consequently, display types 2a. and
2b', providing extreme levels of Peripheral Relatedness,
were sufficient to test the hypothesis that automatic prime
processing could by itself facilitate the perception of of
related objects. m addition to eliminating these two
display types, the remaining display types were modified in
the sense that peripheral objects no longer occupied the
same position across display types. Instead, for every
display type they were randomly assigned a position on one
of the five corners of the imaginary pentagon. This was
done in order to prevent subjects from learning to expect
specific objects at specific positions, which obviously
could affect both the selection of peripheral objects for
fixation and the time needed to identify them.
As in Experiment 1, the six display types constructed in
this manner mapped onto six context conditions. In Experi-
ment 1, this mapping was determined by the episodic member-
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Ship Of the a priori designated target object. In the
present experiment, however, it was determined by the epi-
sodic membership of the peripheral object that was selected
for fixation by the subject. Specifically, each fixation
fell into one of the six following context conditions: two
conditions with a fixation-related object in the center and
one or three fixation-related objects in the periphery,
creating a Central Related/Peripheral l and a Central Re-
lated/Peripheral 3 condition; two conditions with a fixa-
tion-unrelated object in the center and zero or two fixa-
tion-related objects in the periphery, producing a Central
Unrelated/Peripheral 0 and a Central Unrelated/Peripheral 2
condition; and, finally, two conditions with no object in
the center and either zero or three fixation-related objects
in the periphery, resulting in a Central Absent/Peripheral 0
and a Central Absent/Peripheral 3 condition.
The sets of choice alternatives for the object recogni-
tion task following each display were very similar to those
constructed for Experiment 1, but were modified in order to
control for possible nuisance effects that could arise from
the within-subjects administration of the stimuli. Specifi-
cally, rather than always probing for one of the same two
targets (i.e. Al and Bl in Table 1) following all displays
constructed for a given category pair, a different target
was probed for each of the six display types used in this
experiment. Targets were A2 for display la, B2 for display
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lb, Bl for disDlav o^* no *rBpi y 2a, B3 for display 2b, A3 for display 2a'
and Al for display 2^-
.
.his modification was introduced in
order to avoid that subjects would learn that only a limited
set Of Objects needed to be detected in order to perform the
recognition task and consequently would attempt to detect
specific Object features in the displays they were presented
with,
In addition, an inspection of Table 1 will reveal that
this ensured that if a central object was present, there was
a 50 % chance that it would be the target. Consequently,
there was no reason for subjects to be biased towards ne-
glecting the central objects, which would decrease any
effect controlled prime processing might have. Furthermore,
it guaranteed that if a central object was present and the
target was located in the periphery, there was a 50 % chance
that they would be episodically related. As a result,
subjects were not induced to systematically search for
either central-related or central-unrelated peripheral
objects, which obviously would greatly compromise the analy-
sis of scanning patterns across the displays. Finally, it
ensured that if the target was located in the periphery, its
chances of being related versus unrelated to any of the
other objects in the display were 50-50. In this manner,
subjects were discouraged from adopting a strategy of sys-
tematically trying to find the object that was most dis-
similar to the rest of the display.
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Apparatus anH procednT-o
AS in Experixnent l, stimuli, sets of choice alternatives
and mask were presented on a Hewlett-Packard 1300A CRT with
a P-31 phosphor. Eye movement patterns during display
exposure were monitored via a Stanford Research Institute
Dual Purkinje eyetracker with a resolution of lo- of arc and
a 1000 Hz sampling-rate. The eyetracker and CRT were inter-
faced with a Hewlett-Packard 2100 computer used for storage
of the images to be presented and for keeping a complete
record of saccade latencies and eye position, in this
manner it was possible to terminate display exposure and
present the mask once a peripheral object had received a
fixation or no such fixation had occurred within a period of
1 sec following display onset.
Upon arrival, subjects received the same instructions
given in Experiment 1 with the exception that they were
asked to indicate the name of the object that had been in
the display by tapping its serial number in the list of
choice alternatives on the table in front of them. Subjects
were seated 4 6 cm from the CRT, using a bite bar in order to
eliminate head movements and keep viewing distance constant.
Subsequently, the eyetracker was calibrated and subjects
received two series of 56 trials, each consisting of 8
practice trials (selected from the filler stimuli con-
structed for Experiment 1) and 48 experimental trials. Each
trial included the same events described for Experiment 1,
and again no feedback was provided until the end of the
77
experiment which lasted about 40 to 45 minutes.
Design
Each subject received all 96 experimental stimuli (i.e. 6
display types X 16 episodic category pairs) in an in-
dividually randomized order. How many observations this
resulted in for each of the six context conditions naturally
depended on which peripheral objects the subjects chose to
fixate in the various displays. Assuming however, that
subjects would choose peripheral objects at random, the dis-
tribution of the data over the context conditions should be
as follows:
- 40 % of the observations for display types la and lb
should fall in the Central Related/Peripheral 1 condi-
tion, and 60 % in the Central Unrelated/Peripheral 2
condition.
- 80 % of the observations for display types 2a and 2b
should fall in the Central Related/Peripheral 3 condi-
tion, and 20 % in the Central Unrelated/Peripheral 0
condition.
- 80 % of the observations for display types 2a' and 2b'
should fall in the Central Absent/Peripheral 3 condition,
and 20 % in the Central Absent/Peripheral 0 condition.
Consequently, in order to determine whether the likeli-
hood of peripheral object selection is affected by that
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Object's episodic relatednpc=o 4.^xateaness to the previously fixated
and/or other unattended objects in the display, one should
examine how the actual proportions of the data falling into
each of the context conditions deviated from what could be
expected on the basis of random selection. it was therefore
decided to compute the observed proportions across subjects
and perform chi-square tests on the expected-observed dif-
ferences for each of the three pairs of complementary pro-
portions, i.e. i) central Related/Peripheral 1 and Central
unrelated/Peripheral 2, ii) central Related/Peripheral 3 and
central Unrelated/Peripheral 0, and iii) the Central Ab-
sent/Peripheral 3 and Central Absent/Peripheral 0.
As for the analysis of effects of Central and Peripheral
Relatedness on first fixation durations, an analysis of
variance could be performed on the generalized randomized
block design (Federer, 1955; Kirk, 1982) resulting from the
within-subjects administration of the context conditions.
However, the inevitable presence of unequal cell n's did
necessitate the use of the general linear model approach
(Kirk, 1982).
3.2.3 Results
In the following analyses, all trials were excluded on
which a track loss occurred (3 %) , subjects failed to fixate
a peripheral object within a 1 sec period following display
79
onset (4 %)
,
or subjects
„oved their eyes away from the
display center in one direction and ended up fixating a
peripheral object located in another direction (3 %)
.
The expected and observed probabilities of fixating a
peripheral object in the various context conditions are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Expected and observed probabilities of selectina aperipheral object in each of the Context ^
conditions
CONTEXT CONDITION EXPECTED OBSERVED
1) Central Related/Peripheral 1
+
.400
.38 (n=86)
2) Central Unrelated/Peripheral 2
.600
.62 (n=142)
3) Central Related/Peripheral 3
+
.800
.73 (n=173)
4) Central Unrelated/Peripheral 0 .200
.27 (n=64)
5) Central Absent/Peripheral 3
+
.800
.78 (n=176)
6) Central Absent/Peripheral 0 .200 .22 (n=50)
The data presented here, show that no clear discrepancies
between expected and observed probabilities emerged. This
was confirmed by insignificant chi-square tests of expected-
observed differences in the data-distributions over the
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complexaentary conditions i and 2 [chi-square =
.952, p >
.05], conditions 3 and 4 [chi-square = x.155, p >
.05], and
conditions 5 and 6 [chi-square = 1.418 £ > .05].
This absence of systematic effects of Central or Periphe-
ral Relatedness on peripheral object selection indicates
that either episodic dissimilarity does not inevitably imply
featural dissimilarity, or that featural dissimilarity does
not determine the direction of attentional shifts in the
paradigm employed in this experiment. Either way, the
absence of a Central Relatedness effect runs counter to the
hypothesis that the unrelated target superiority in Experi-
ment 1 should be attributed to covert attentional shifts
towards these objects. Furthermore, the failure to find any
Peripheral Relatedness effects in either the Central Present
or Central Absent conditions replicates the results obtained
in Experiment 1. it provides converging evidence for con-
cluding that "pop-out" effects are not a fundamental cha-
racteristic of object perception in displays containing
isolated objects with different episodic category member-
ships. Admittedly, it could be pointed out, that in spite
of the insignificant expected-observed differences in the
three data-distributions there appears to be a consistent
tendency towards selecting the unrelated objects (i.e. 2.2 %
for the first distribution, 7% for the second, and 2.2.% for
the third)
.
In view of previous evidence for such a bias
(e.g. Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) this could be taken to
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suggest that there is a small «f^f^ 4- ^effect of episodic relatedness
in the peripheral object selection data, which went un-
noticed because of a lack of statistical power. it should
be noted, however, that even if this is the case, the effect
size (i.e. 2-7%) does appear too small to explain the 9-14%
unrelated target superiority in Experiment l. Also, when
computed per subject and per distribution, the bias towards
selecting unrelated objects did not appear to be very con-
sistent since it was found for only 4 subjects in the first
distribution, 4 in the second and 3 in the third.
The analysis of the first fixation durations revealed a
significant main effect of context condition [F(5,35) =
3.412, E < .05]. Mean first fixation durations (FFD) for
each of the context conditions are presented in Table 5.
Planned comparisons using the Dunn-Sidak procedure (Kirk,
1982) revealed that the 40 ms difference between conditions
1 and 2 was significant [tDS(35) = 2.939, p < .05]. This
indicates that controlled object processing primes the
representations of episodically related objects and facili-
tates subsequent perceptual processing of these objects.
Additional support for this conclusion was provided by the
significant 59 ms difference between conditions 3 and 4
[tDS(35) = 3.966, p < .05]. Although the latter difference
was somewhat larger, suggesting an effect of the number of
peripheral primes and consequently of automatic prime pro-
cessing, further comparisons failed to confirm this hypothe-
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sis. specifically, the insignificant difference between
conditions 5 and 6 ttDS(35) =
.377, p > .lo, indicates that
Table 5. Mean first fixation durations (FFD) perContext condition (in ms)
CONTEXT CONDITION FFD
1) Central Related/Peripheral 1 252 (n==86)
2) Central Unrelated/Peripheral 2 292 (n==142)
3) Central Related/Peripheral 3 227 (n==173)
4) Central Unrelated/Peripheral 0 286 (n==64)
5) Central Absent/Peripheral 3 245 (n=176)
6) Central Absent/Peripheral 0 251 (n= 50)
automatic prime processing was insufficient to by itself
facilitate the identification of primed objects. The ab-
sence of a significant difference between conditions 2 and 4
[tDS(35) = .394, p > .10] is completely in line with this
finding. Finally, while the 25 ms difference between condi-
tions 1 and 3 suggests that extrafoveal objects could per-
haps exert a priming influence when presented in the company
of a related foveal object, it does not reach significance
[tDS(35) = 1.894, p > .10].
Admittedly, this exploration of the first fixation data
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e
e
for effects of central and peripheral primes could be criti-
cized for being somewhat fragmentary in its use of multipl
pairwise comparisons. it therefore appears to be worthwhil
to report the results of an alternative analysis which is
less susceptible to this criticism. Specifically, if the
central prime effect is designated as c and the peripheral
prime effect as the difference between the means of con-
ditions 1 and 2 (i.e. 61) can be regarded as reflecting c,
While P is reflected by the difference between means 5 and 6
(i.e. 53). Following an additive logic, the difference
between means 3 and 4 (i.e. 52) can then be viewed as the
result of C+P. On this view, estimates of c and P can be
obtained, which derive from the data of all context condi-
tions simultaneously. Specifically, for C this estimate is
provided by the equation {S1+(S2-S3) ) /2 , and for P it can be
found in the equation (<S3+(52-<!>l) ) /2. Following their
computation for each subject, these equations yield an
average C estimate of 4 6.5 ms and an average P estimate of
12.5 ms. Apart from confirming the conclusions of the first
analysis (i.e. a significant effect of central prime pro-
cessing [t(7) = 2.83, E < .05] and a non-significant effect
of peripheral prime processing [t(7) = 1.06, p > .10]), it
is interesting to note that the size of the central prime
effect is quite comparable to that of the priming effects
observed in the Henderson et al. (1987, 1988) studies (i.e.
30-60 ms)
.
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The xnain focus of the experixnents reported above, was to
explore the existence and the characteristics of a pricing
mechanism operating between representations of objects
likely to appear in the same real-world scene.
While the unrelated target superiority in the Foveal
Present conditions of Experiment 1 provided only indirect
evidence for the presence of such a process, direct proof
was found in the decrease of first fixation durations for
central-related objects in Experiment 2. Given this result,
the absence in Experiment 1 of an increase in target re-
cognition performance contingent upon the presence of either
foveal or extrafoveal primes, suggested that priming does
not facilitate the identification of unattended objects.
Evidence in agreement with this conclusion has also been
presented by Boyce, Pollatsek, and Rayner (1989) who found
peripheral target detection in tachistoscopically presented
scenes to be independent of the episodic relatedness between
the target and other objects in the scene. These results
are entirely compatible with the view (Reinitz, Wright, &
Loftus, 1989; Warren & Morton, 1982) that meaning-based
priming does not facilitate object identification by bring-
ing a conceptual object representation so close to the
activation level required to set off an identification
response that a minimal amount of consistent visual informa-
tion is sufficient to pass this threshold. Rather, priming
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aids the identif i<-»+-i«« •r cation of isolated objects by increasing
the rate at which the object- s features are extracted fro»
the inage in a capacity-limited process (Biederman, Blickle
Teitelbau»,
. Klatsky, 1988, requiring both visual acuity
and a sufficiently selective allocation of visual attention
(Strong & Whitehead, 1989)
.
in addition to this need for attention to the target in
order for priming to surface, controlled processing of the
prime seems to be a necessary condition for priming to
originate, as indicated by the absence of a significant
effect Of peripheral primes on first fixation durations in
Experiment 2. while this conclusion is corroborated by the
Henderson et al. (1988) failure to find a target-display
consistency effect, it could perhaps be viewed as too strong
given the suggestion of a peripheral prime effect in Experi-
ment 2 conditional upon the simultaneous presence of a
foveal prime. However, contrary to the Henderson et al.
experiments, the task conditions in this experiment did not
favor a standard sequence for leisurely fixating all objects
in the displays. As a result it is not impossible that an
initially wide distribution or even a selective covert shift
of attention may have preceded the first peripheral object
fixation, thus allowing for a facilitation of peripheral
prime processing by the central prime. Such a facilitation
could then lead to sufficiently detailed pattern recognition
of peripheral primes, in order to cause an additional
priming benefit for the first related object that is fixa-
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ted. consequently, while this would perhaps challenge a
strict sequential
.odel of visual attention (Henderson et
al., 1989), it would still be consistent with the claims
that priming requires the allocation of attention to the
prime and will only facilitate extrafoveal information use
for attended objects (Henderson et al., 1988).
Based on the above characterization of episodic priming,
some predictions can be made which should allow for an
unambiguous test of the role of this mechanism in the ap-
pearance of object probability effects on object identifica-
tion in scenes. Specifically, if episodic inter-object
priming is solely responsible for these effects, object
identification should not be easier for 1) probable objects
that are the first object attended to in a scene, 2) probab-
le objects that are not selectively attended to, and 3)
probable objects attended to after attending to an im-
probable object.
As was already mentioned, research reported by Biederman
and colleagues clearly contradicts all three predictions in
its claim to have established superior perceptibility for
any probable object at any position in any natural scene
that is presented for a mere 100-150 ms. Recently, this
claim has been reaffirmed in a study (Boyce, Pollatsek, &
Rayner, 1989) revealing that target-background consistency
is a crucial determinant of this immediate object probabi-
lity effect on pre-cued target detection, while the target's
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episodic relatedness to other objects in the display i.
Wholly irrelevant. However, as argued in Chapter 1, thi.
kind of research can be criticized for its susceptibility to
the influence of post-perceptual response strategies ob-
scuring genuine perceptual effects of scene context on
object processing. The large reduction in task performance
when, as in Experiment l, accuracy of forced choice recogni-
tion is measured rather than accuracy of simple present-
absent decisions, only serves to strengthen this suspicion.
Moreover, even if it can be assumed that the observed
effects are indeed perceptual, they are by no means man-
datory, as some authors claim (Klatsky et al., 1981).
Recently, De Graef, Christiaens and d'Ydewalle (1990) repor-
ted on the context-sensitivity of first fixation durations
for objects incidentally fixated during the free exploration
of a scene in search for non-objects (Kroll & Potter, 1984).
With respect to object probability effects, they found that
such effects clearly did not surface from the very first
scene fixation on but rather developed gradually over the
course of scene exploration. At the very least, this leaves
open the possibility that, under some conditions, individual
object processing and subsequent inter-object priming may be
at the basis of object probability effects. Specifically,
when one looks at the differences between a task allowing
only one glimpse at a scene in order to detect an object at
an uncertain position and a task allowing for free scene
exploration in search for non-objects, the crucial deter-
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minant of differences in the characteristics of context
effects may be the mode of attentional distribution adopted
by the viewer. indeed, the former type of task is much more
likely to favor a wide distribution of attention across the
entire scene, favoring the extraction and use of low-resolu-
tion, global information such as scene background. m the
latter type of task, however, a sequential distribution of
attention to successively fixated potential objects is more
appropriate, favoring the operation of mechanisms such as
the episodic priming described above. Consequently, unless
the latter task can be demonstrated to be a less adequate
approximation of everyday scene perception, a rejection of
inter-object priming as an account of object probability
effects in scenes will have to based on a direct test of the
three forementioned predictions under task conditions that
do not discourage or even prevent selective attention to
individual objects in the scene. Until then, an identifica-
tion advantage for the probable objects in a real-world
scene can not be taken as a sound basis for rejecting data-
driven models of object identification in favor of concept-
driven accounts.
APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL
EPISODICAL
CATEGORIES
EXTRAFOVEAL
TARGET*;
FOVEAL
PRIMES
EXTRAFOVEAL PRIMES
1) Gas Station car gaspump motor-
cycle
jerry
can
bus
Orchestra piano i-i uuipen violin flute horn
2) Laundry Room iron shirt dress tie
Playgrounds football
helmet
football baseball
bat
tennis-
racket
baseball
3 ) Farm horse sheep rooster scythe cat
Living Room rocking
chair
televi"
sion
dresser lamp vacuum
cleaner
4) Street bus fire
hydrant
bicycle traffic
light
motor-
cycle
Kitchen triage scale egg
timer
garbage
can
5^ Dinner Tam<» lorK salt
shaker
wine-
glass
bottle pot
Toolshed axe paint-
brush
saw file
6 ) Garden watering
can
shears spade hose
Laundry Room sweater pants ironing
board
dress tie
7) Pole penguin igloo seal polar
bear
walrus
Farm Dia barn sheep scythe tractor
8) Kitchen kettle frying
pan
rolling
pin
pitcher blender
Bathroom blowdryer comb tooth-
paste
tooth-
brush
hair-
brush
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
9) Playgrounds wagon tricycle roller
skates
kite skate
board
Office telephone desk computer stapler envelope
10) Street traffic
light
bicycle parking
meter
bus ambu-
lance
Farm cow chicken goose pier tractor
11) Garden roller pitch-
fork
wheel-
barrow
spade rake
Living room couch table vacuum
cleaner
chair lamp
12) Toolshed drill pliers paint-
brush
screw-
driver
wrench
Vegetable
Stand
pepper carrot arti-
choke
onion mushroom
13) Fruit Basket apple banana pear pine-
apple
melon
Playgrounds skate board roller
skates
top tri-
cycle
baseball
bat
14) Bedroom dresser bed alarm-
clock
chair lamp
Street motorcycle parking
meter
car truck eimbu-
lance
15) Farm goat rooster horse milkcan dog
Orchestra drum guitar trumpet xylo-
phone
flute
16) Garden wheelbarrow spade roller hose shears
Kitchen coffee pot funnel toaster blender rolling
pin
: CHOICE SETS FOR EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI
EPISODICAL
CATEGORIES
TARGETS DISTRACTORS
1) Gas station car airpump fire hy-
drant
truck
Orchestra piano drum xylopnone saxophone
2 ) Laundry room iron pants ironing
board
skirt
Playgrounds football
helmet
frisbee skateboard ball
3 ) Farm horse goose barn dog
Living room rocking
h a ^ V
turntable couch vase
4) Street car ambulance parking
meter
Kit chf»n StOVG frying pan pot blender
5) Dinner table fork spoon pitcher ladle
Toolshed axe drill wrench pliers
6) Garden watering
can
rake roller lawnmower
owoau6r clothes
rack
iron skirt
7) Pole whale harpoon sled
Farm pig horse dog well
8) Kitchen kettle pot toaster egg timer
Bathroom soap razor shaving
brush
9) Playgrounds wagon tennis-
racket
baseball
bat
ball
Office telephone paperpunch ashtray typewriter
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
10) Street traffic
light
truck mailbox motorcycle
Farm cow dog sheep barn
11) Garden roller hose lawnmower spray can
Living room couch vase telephone dresser
12) Toolshed drill file saw hammer
Vegetable
stand
pepper corn tomato cellery
13) Fruit basket apple coconut orange grapes
Playgrounds skateboard slingshot wagon scooter
14) Bedroom dresser pajamas radio pillow
Street motorcycle fire hy-
drant
bus mailbox
15) Farm goat sheep cow tractor
Orchestra drum horn piano violin
16) Garden wheelbarrow rake lawnmower lawnchair
Kitchen coffee pot grill cup pot
C: PRACTICE AND CONTROL
FOVEAL TARGETS EXTRAFOVEAL UNRELATED OBJECTS
1) shoe door broom knife tie squirrel
2) mouse whistle light-
bulb
glass moon boat
3) anchor banana leaf onion bell screw
4) cannon funnel key pipe window pitcher
5) sock cup broom i- iuue apple star
6) whistle squirrel pipe
bat
pear bell
7) spoon tootn—
paste
moon bat rabbit anchor
8) lock pineapple light-
bulb
leaf hair-
brush
tie
9) flower shoe key glass cat window
10) hat egg timer cannon door stool
11) pitcher fire hy-
drant
onion boat scythe
12) broom tooth-
brush
rolling
pin
chicken knife
13) scissors bell vacuum
cleaner
jerry
can
goat envelope
14) pipe pear lamp comb file mushroom
15) glass sock whistle lock flower hat
16) squirrel tooth-
paste
cup pine-
apple
shoe egg timer
17) lightbulb broom pipe moon key cannon
18) bat flute roller
skate
leaf glass door
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APPENDIX C (Continued)
19) rabbit apple paint-
brush
cat I- Xcs baseball
bat
20) star bell anchor banana till n*^/^t.» stool
21) chicken pitcher broom scissors pipe mushroom
22) envelope ambu 1 a
n
mouse whistle pear leaf
23) knife onion tooth-
brush
vacuum
cleaner
jerry-
can
file
24) screw boat rolling
pin
leimp comb goat
APPENDIX D: SETS FOR PRACTICE AND CONTROL
TARGETS
DISTRACTORS
1 ) shoe boot skate clog
2 ) mouse
cat
rat
3) anchor surfboa r-H boat raft
4) cannon tank bazooka machine gun
5 ) sock
pants boot
6) whistle horn flute rattle
7 ) spoon knife pitcher rolling pin
8) lock key chain door
9) flower bee tree leaf
10) hat
scarf umbrella
11) pitcher funne
1
cup knife
12) broom dustpan mop bucket
13) scissors thread button
14) pipe cLoiiK^L cty cigarette lighter
15) glass cup jug
16) scpiirrel tree cat
17) lightbulb lightswitch lamp
18) bat owl mouse cat
19) rabbit fox squirrel
20) star satceiite rocket
21) chicken coop
22) envelope paper clip pen stamp
23) knife bread butter cheese
24) screw nail hammer file
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NOTES
1. Naturally, a failure to observe any target recognition
accuracy differences in the present experiment would be
difficult to interpret as showing that priming is indeed
constrained to controlled object-processing, since
prime-target relatedness in all stimuli is defined
episodically rather than semantically
, the absence of any
effects could also mean that priming is constrained to
semantically related objects. It was decided to filter
out this interpretational problem in a separate
experiment should it arise.
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